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High stakes testing has been long established in the English school system.  
In this article, we seek to demonstrate how testing has become pivotal to 
securing the neo-liberal restructuring of schools, that commenced during 
the Thatcher era, and is reaching a critical point at the current time. 
Central to this project has been the need to assert increased control over 
teachers’ work and this is being achieved through a pincer movement 
of marketisation and managerialism. Both of these ‘policy technologies’ 
require the value of individual teachers’ work to be measured and 
quantified, and in this article we seek to demonstrate how high stakes 
testing underpins these processes. The article concludes by making the 
case for reclaiming teaching as a professional process, within the context 
of education, as a public good and conducted in a public space.
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In many national education systems high stakes testing has become an increasingly 
central	element	of	policy	and	development,	including	the	USA	(Amrein	and	Berliner,	
2002),	Australia	(Klenowski	and	Wyatt-Smith,	2012)	and	South	Africa	(Howie,	2012).	
Whilst	an	almost	ubiquitous	political	concern,	the	definition	of	high	stakes	testing	can	
still vary from system to system. In an English context, West states:
The national tests taken at the age of 11 and the public examinations taken at the 
ages	of	16	and	18	can	be	considered	to	be	‘high	stakes’.	Such	tests	determine,	or	
help	to	determine,	the	future	of	pupils,	teachers	or	schools.	(2010,	p.25)
West’s	 definition	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 widespread	 impact	 of	 high	 stakes	 testing,	
with	consequences	for	students,	parents	and	communities,	as	well	as	those	working	
in	schools.	However,	 this	article	specifically	focuses	on	teachers,	and	the	impact	of	
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high	stakes	testing	on	teachers’	work.	radical	education	reform	in	England	in	recent	
years	has	necessitated	a	significant	reconfiguring	of	teachers’	work.	Within	the	UK,	
a	 downward	 pressure	 on	 public	 spending	 has	 driven	 an	 intensification	 of	 teachers’	
labour	 process,	 whilst	 the	 perceived	 imperative	 to	 perform	 highly	 in	 international	
league	tables	has	narrowed	the	focus	of	teaching	and	learning.	These	issues	are	nested	
within	a	wider	set	of	ideological	struggles	over	the	purposes	and	future	of	education.	
These	 are	 struggles	 that	 are	 intensifying	 as	 the	 neo-liberal	 drive	 towards	 systemic	
privatisation becomes more apparent. Given these developments, the imperative 
to	 re-fashion	 teachers’	 work	 becomes	 critical.	As	 ingersoll	 argues,	 ‘This	 desire	 to	
increase	control	over	what	goes	on	in	schools	and	what	teachers	do	in	their	classrooms	
resurfaces	on	a	regular	basis	as	a	central	tenet	of	education	reform’	(2003,	p.35).	in	this	
article,	we	seek	to	demonstrate	how	high	stakes	testing	has	been	pivotal	to	asserting	
an	increased	control	over	teachers’	work	as	pressures	develop	to	drive	down	the	costs	
of	teachers’	labour	process,	narrow	the	focus	of	the	curriculum	and,	crucially,	weaken	
teachers’	collective	capacity	to	resist	such	developments.	
in	 an	 article	 published	 over	 10	 years	 ago,	 and	 widely	 cited	 since,	 Stephen	 Ball	
argued	 that	new	policy	 technologies	were	not	only	 re-shaping	 teachers’	 experience	
of	work,	but	what	it	meant	to	‘be	a	teacher’	(Ball,	2003).	Ball	identified	three	specific	
policy technologies: the market, managerialism and performativity, arguing in a 
later	contribution	 that,	 ‘They	 interrelate	and	complement	one	another	and	work	on	
individual	practitioners,	work	groups	and	whole	organisations	 to	reconstitute	social	
relations, forms of esteem and value, sense of purpose and notions of excellence and 
good	practice’	 (Ball,	 2008	p.	 42).	 in	 the	2003	article,	Ball	 focused	his	 analysis	on	
performativity	as	a	policy	technology	that	had	a	particular	impact	on	re-casting	teachers’	
identities.	 He	 further	 argued	 that	 the	 balance	 between	 the	 different	 technologies	
differed	between	national	contexts,	but	their	growing	influence	represented	a	global,	
and	globalising,	phenomenon.	in	this	article,	we	seek	to	draw	on	Ball’s	use	of	policy	
technologies to analyse more recent developments in the English school system, and 
specifically	in	relation	to	high	stakes	testing,	as	England	emerges	even	more	strongly	
as	a	‘world	leader’	in	driving	forward	the	neo-liberal	reform	agenda.	However,	in	this	
article	we	seek	to	focus	on	the	two	policy	technologies	that	in	Ball’s	2003	analysis	
featured much less, namely marketisation and managerialism. Our argument is that 
in	 England,	 in	 the	 period	 since	 2003,	 and	 particularly	 in	 the	 period	 following	 the	
election of the Coalition government in 2010, it is the pincer movement of markets 
and	managerialism	that	have	combined	to	effectively	and	radically	re-shape	teachers’	
experience	of	work.	if	teachers’	identities	are	being	re-framed,	and	we	believe	they	
are, it is the dual-drive of marketisation and managerialism that is shaping that 
experience.	The	 two	 elements	 are	 distinct,	 but	 are	 interdependent.	They	work	 in	 a	
complementary	way	to	shape	teachers’	work,	determining	what	teachers	do	and	how	
they	do	it.	Furthermore,	what	both	have	in	common	is	a	dependency	on	high	stakes	
testing, as both have at their heart the need to turn teaching into numbers – to make the 
process	of	teaching	something	that	can	be	measured	and	quantified	(Taubman,	2009).	
in	this	article	we	seek	to	demonstrate	how	these	two	mechanisms	of	control,	linked	
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through	their	common	dependency	on	high	stakes	testing,	create	a	‘free	market,	strong	
state’	framework	within	which	teachers’	work	is	determined.	This	‘free	market,	strong	
state’	analysis	draws	on	Andrew	Gamble’s	analysis	of	Thatcherism	(1988)	and	frames	
our	argument	that	current	English	education	reforms	represent	a	Thatcherite	‘second	
wave’,	and	the	continued	slow-burn	of	a	neo-liberal	project	commenced	in	earnest	in	
the	1980s	(Stevenson,	2011).
The article begins by providing a contextual background in relation to the development 
of a high stakes testing system in England. We then argue that such testing has 
been	 necessary	 to	 transform	 teachers’	 labour	 into	 a	 product	 that	 can	 be	 quantified	
and	 measured,	 before	 demonstrating	 how	 the	 quantification	 of	 teachers’	 labour	 is	
fundamental to the creation of both marketised and managerialist modes of control. 
The	paper	concludes	by	offering	a	more	optimistic	vision	of	what	teaching	might	look	
like and some of the challenges that need to be confronted if the current trajectory of 
policy is to be interrupted.
HIgH STAkES TESTINg IN ENgLAND – A SUMMARY
Within	the	United	Kingdom	school	sector,	education	is	a	devolved	responsibility	with	
constituent	nations	maintaining	their	own	distinct	education	systems.	it	is	important	
to	assert	that	this	is	an	article	about	England	and	not	the	wider	United	Kingdom.	The	
school	 systems	 of	Wales,	Northern	 ireland	 and	 Scotland	 look	 quite	 different	 from	
that in England, and these differences are perhaps at their sharpest in relation to the 
ways	in	which	students	are	tested,	and	the	ways	in	which	test	data	are	used	for	wider	
purposes.	This	 important	point	highlights	 the	need	to	 locate	policy	within	a	global,	
and globalising, context, but recognising that policy enactments assume very different 
forms	in	local	contexts	(rizvi	and	Lingard,	2010).
England has arguably long had a high-stakes testing regime. This has been based on a 
number	of	measurement	points	at	which	children	were	sifted,	some	being	given	access	
to	a	higher	level	of	education	whilst	others	were	shut	out,	or	re-directed	to	a	different,	
less	‘prestigious’	route.	This	was	particularly	evident	in	the	11+	exam	which	acted	to	
select	apparently	‘higher-ability’	children	who	gained	access	to	an	‘academic’	grammar	
school,	whilst	the	remainder	of	children	(often	as	high	as	75%	of	a	cohort)	were	sent	
to	more	vocationally	oriented	schools,	from	which	the	vast	majority	entered	directly	
into	employment	(Benn	and	Chitty,	1997).	The	sifting	process	then	continued	at	the	
ages	of	16	(ordinary	Level	General	Certificate	Education)	and	18	(Advanced-Level	
General	Certificate	of	Education),	each	occasion	acting	as	a	gateway	and	a	rationing	
mechanism in accessing further educational opportunities. Both of these examination 
systems	became	established	in	the	1950s	and	continued	largely	unchanged	until	the	late	
1980s.	At	this	point,	o	levels	were	reformed	and	replaced	by	the	General	Certificate	of	
Secondary	Education	(GCSE),	whilst	A-levels	have	continued	as	the	examination	for	
18 year olds to the present day, albeit in revised form. That reform of both exams is 
currently the focus of sharp debate attests to the continuing contestation of education 
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purposes	and	aims	(Guardian	online,	2013a	and	also	www.ofqual.gov.uk).
in	small	pockets	of	 the	country,	 the	11+	has	 remained	 intact	as	some	Conservative	
Party controlled localities retained a selective system of grammar schools and 
secondary	moderns.	However,	for	the	vast	majority	of	the	country	this	system	came	
under	challenge	in	the	1960s.	The	introduction	of	open	entry	comprehensive	schools	
obviated	 the	need	 for	 a	 selective	 exam	at	 11,	whilst	 the	 introduction	of	 the	GCSE	
provided	 a	 single	 unified	 form	 of	 assessment	 for	 16	 year	 olds.	 This	 replaced	 the	
previous	split	qualifications	at	16	that	both	reflected,	and	perpetuated,	 the	grammar	
school-secondary modern divide.
The	 introduction	of	 the	new	single	qualification	at	16+	was	generally	considered	a	
progressive	 reform	 (Lowe,	 2007).	 However,	 its	 introduction	 coincided	 with	 the	
introduction	 of	 the	 1988	 Education	 reform	Act	 (see	 Gillard	 2011),	 which	 had	 a	
very	different	impact	on	the	school	system.	This	was	the	single	piece	of	legislation	
that redirected the English school system on a very different trajectory from the 
comprehensive,	 welfarist	 principles	 that	 had	 developed	 in	 the	 post-war	 period.	
Previously	 described	 by	 one	 of	 us	 as	 English	 education’s	 ‘neo-liberal	 moment’	
(Stevenson,	2011),	it	was	the	1988	Act	that	provided	the	architecture	for	an	increasingly	
marketised	system	of	public	education	and	which	sought	to	establish	new	hierarchies	
in	the	school	system	(Simon,	1987).	At	the	centre	of	the	1988	Act	was	the	introduction	
of	a	raft	of	new	testing	arrangements	(for	students	at	7,	11,	14	and	16),	coupled	with	
publication	 of	 results	 in	 the	 form	 of	 league	 tables.	The	 tests	were	 called	 Standard	
Assessment	Tests	(SATs)	and	were	run	by	government.	At	Key	Stages	4	and	5,	these	
SATs	are	replaced	by	GCSE	and	A-level	tests.	This	new	testing	framework	represented	
a	qualitative	shift	in	the	English	high	stakes	system	as	testing	was	extended	beyond	a	
‘sift	and	sort’	function,	to	one	in	which	a	quasi-market	in	schooling	would	become	the	
key mechanism for ensuring school accountability. 
The	1988	Act	was	 introduced	by	 a	Conservative	government	 committed	 to	 radical	
neo-liberal	restructuring	of	public	education,	and	was	one	element	of	a	much	more	
fundamental	restructuring	of	the	welfare	state	(Gough,	1983).	However,	the	election	
of a Labour government some years later did little to change the fundamental direction 
of	travel	and	the	new	government	showed	no	desire	to	challenge	the	logic	of	league-
tables	as	 the	basis	of	school	accountability	(Chitty,	2013).	However,	within	Labour	
policy	there	was	a	recognition	that	quasi-markets	and	parental	choice	did	not	always	
deliver	the	desired	outcomes	(working	class	communities	often	remained	stubbornly	
loyal	 to	 their	 schools	despite	being	 told	 they	were	 ‘failing’)	and	as	a	consequence,	
externally	imposed	target-setting	emerged	more	prominently	in	policy	(ozga,	2009).	
This	manifested	itself	initially	as	a	policy	of	‘naming	and	shaming’	schools	judged	to	
be	below	‘target’,	but	in	more	recent	times	the	integration	of	high	stakes	testing	and	the	
national inspection regime has become central to linking processes of marketisation 
with	managerialism.	The	national	inspectorate	in	its	modern	form	was	established	in	
the	years	following	the	1988	Act	and	is	known	as	the	office	for	Standards	in	Education	
(ofsted).	The	 role	 of	ofsted	 is	 to	 hold	 schools	 accountable	 for	 the	 education	 they	
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provide	by	inspecting	all	schools	against	a	common	framework.	At	the	current	time,	
schools	are	categorised	following	inspection	as	either	‘outstanding’,	‘good’,	‘requires	
improvement’	or	‘inadequate’	(richards,	2012).	Significantly,	‘requires	improvement’	
was	introduced	to	replace	the	previous	category	of	‘satisfactory’,	which	the	current	
Chief	 inspector	 deemed	 to	 be	 no	 longer	 good	 enough	 (ofsted	 online,	 2012a).	 in	
perhaps	one	of	the	clearest	examples	of	how	‘good’	is	re-cast	in	the	new	performative	
culture,	it	is	now	explicitly	the	case	that	‘satisfactory’	is	no	longer	satisfactory.	ofsted’s	
inspection	judgements	rely	heavily	on	schools’	performance	in	standardised	tests	with	
test data emerging as the key indicator of school quality. School examination and 
testing	data	is	now	the	central	focus	for	this	organisation,	most	obviously	illustrated	by	
the	introduction	of	‘floor	targets’,	raw	measurements	of	the	percentage	of	children	in	a	
school	who	have	to	pass	a	benchmark	level	of	attainment	for	the	school	to	be	deemed	
to be acceptable. Such measures are crude in nature as the targets take no account of 
the demographics, starting points, and potential barriers to learning that some cohorts 
of students face. An example of this type of crude target is that in the 2012-13 academic 
year,	all	secondary	schools	had	to	ensure	that	40%	of	their	students	passed	5	GCSE	
examinations	 (including	Maths	and	English)	at	a	grade	C	or	above,	with	 the	 target	
rising	to	50%	by	2015	regardless	of	the	entry	profile	of	students.	Schools	which	do	not	
meet these targets are not only put under more intense scrutiny by Ofsted, but are also 
more	likely	to	be	given	a	‘notice	to	improve’,	or	placed	in	‘special	measures’.	Such	
scenarios	open	up	the	possibility	of	a	school	being	forcibly	‘academised’,	whereby	the	
school is removed from local authority control and its governing body is replaced by an 
imposed	‘trust’.	in	many	cases,	‘forced	academisation’	involves	handing	responsibility	
for	the	school	to	a	private	sector	sponsor	and	so	the	intimate	connection	between	high	
stakes testing, inspection and the goal of securing incremental privatisation across 
the	school	sector	becomes	transparent.	These	processes	are	now	well	established,	and	
deeply	embedded,	in	the	English	school	system.	More	than	50%	of	secondary	schools	
have	either	opted	for,	or	been	coerced	into,	academisation,	whilst	 the	proportion	of	
primary	schools	remains	much	lower,	but	is	increasing	steadily.
TEACHERS’ LABOUR: THE QUANTIfICATION Of VALUE AND 
THE QUEST fOR CONTROL
In order to understand the pivotal role played by high stakes testing in asserting 
control	over	teachers’	work,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	political	right’s	critique	
of	‘professionalism’	and	the	role	of	producer	interests.	For	those	on	the	political	right,	
accountability	 is	based	within	 the	market,	and	 the	accountability	of	 the	producer	 is	
through	 the	exercising	of	choice	by	 the	consumer	 (Friedman	and	Friedman,	1980).	
The	market	provides	the	means	by	which	particular	behaviours	are	either	rewarded	
or	punished.	The	problem	for	the	political	right	has	always	been	that	an	approach	to	
welfare	provision	that	removed	welfare	from	the	market	(a	key	principle	of	the	early	
welfare	state	according	to	Marshall,	1950),	also	removed	welfare	professionals	from	
the disciplinary control of market forces. Without the constraints imposed by market 
forces,	 then	welfare	professionals	were	able	 to	‘take	over’	 the	 institutions	 in	which	
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they	worked,	and	run	them	in	their	own	interests	(Adam	Smith	institute,	1984).	it	is	
this	analysis	that	frames	the	political	right’s	concept	of	‘producer	capture’	and	that	
underscores	much	of	the	neo-liberal	attack	on	the	welfare	state	in	general,	and	public	
sector	workers	and	their	trade	unions	in	particular.
For	 the	 right,	 schools	 were	 always	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 producer	 capture	
because	of	difficulties	associated	with	placing	any	clear	value	on	the	work	of	teachers	
(Friedman	and	Friedman	1980).	This	point	was	recognised	by	Connell,	who	argued:	
Teaching	 is	 a	 labour	 process	 without	 an	 object.	 At	 best	 it	 has	 an	 object	 so	
intangible – the minds of the kids, of their capacity to learn – that it cannot be 
specified	in	any	but	vague	and	metaphorical	ways.	A	great	deal	of	work	is	done	
in	schools,	day	in	and	day	out,	but	this	work	does	not	produce	any	things.	Nor	
does	it,	like	other	white	collar	work,	produce	visible	and	quantifiable	effects	–	so	
many pensions paid, so many dollars turned over, so many patients cured. The 
‘outcomes	of	teaching’,	to	use	the	jargon	of	educational	research,	are	notoriously	
difficult	to	measure.	(Connell,	1985,	p.70).	
The	 logic	 of	 Connell’s	 argument	 immediately	 posed	 a	 challenge	 for	 those	 who	
sought	to	assert	greater	control	over	teachers’	work.	Put	simply,	if	it	was	the	case	that	
teachers’	work	was	incapable	of	being	accurately	measured,	either	in	terms	of	quantity	
or	quality,	how	might	teachers	realistically	be	‘managed’?	How	might	they	be	directed	
towards	 particular	 activities,	 and	 critically,	 how	might	 they	 be	 held	 to	 account	 for	
meeting	whatever	objectives	were	imposed	on	them?	Such	an	analysis	drew	directly	on	
Taylor’s	case	for	scientific	management	(Taylor,	1914)	in	which	he	argued	that	workers’	
control	of	their	own	labour	process	derived	from	their	own	knowledge	and	expertise	in	
relation	to	their	work.	only	when	that	knowledge	was	transferred	to	managers	could	
management	assert	serious	control	over	 their	employees.	Hence,	Taylor’s	argument	
that	 all	 labour	processes	must	 be	deconstructed	 and	 subject	 to	 ‘scientific’	 analysis.	
By this he meant fragmenting each activity into a number of discrete elements and 
transforming	each	one	 into	a	measureable	and	quantifiable	process.	Such	a	process	
was	considered	to	increase	efficiency	in	two	ways.	First,	by	identifying	‘low	value’	
elements	of	the	labour	process,	whereby	elements	of	work	deemed	to	require	less	skill	
could	be	allocated	lower	cost	labour.	Second,	the	quantification	of	the	value	of	output	
would	facilitate	more	sophisticated	performance	comparison	between	employees	with	
Taylor	 arguing	 that	 performance	 could	 be	 enhanced	 by	 linking	 individual	 worker	
output	much	more	closely	to	rewards	(and	sanctions).	it	follows	that	none	of	this	could	
be	achieved	without	not	only	being	able	to	quantify	the	‘value’	of	output	generally,	but	
specifically	being	able	to	quantify	the	output	of	individual	workers.
Critiques	of	Taylorism	gave	rise	to	a	rich	critical	tradition	in	the	sociology	of	work,	
initiated,	arguably,	by	Braverman’s	seminal	contribution	‘Labor	and	monopoly	capital’	
(1974).	Braverman	exposed	the	‘science’	behind	Taylorism,	and	relocated	it	within	the	
context	of	an	employment	relationship	in	which	the	employer	can	only	realise	surplus	
when	 a	worker’s	 ability	 to	work	 is	 transformed	 into	productive	 labour.	Braverman	
argued	that	‘control’	of	the	labour	process	was	the	central	challenge	for	management,	
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and	that	this	was	best	achieved	by	separating	the	planning	of	work	from	the	doing	of	
work,	thereby	‘destroying	the	craft	as	a	process	under	the	control	of	the	worker,	he	
[the	manager]	reconstitutes	it	as	a	process	under	his	own	control’	(Braverman,	1974,	
p78).	Such	a	framework	of	analysis	was	soon	applied	to	the	work	of	teachers	and	there	
has	been	a	considerable	volume	of	scholarship	that	has	drawn	on	this	tradition	(ozga	
and	Lawn	1981;	Carter	1997a	and	b;	Smyth	2001;	Smyth	et	al.	2000).	However,	for	
some	 time	 this	 tradition	has	been	 in	 retreat	 (reid,	2003	and	Carter	and	Stevenson,	
2012)	and	it	has	become	fashionable	to	assert	that	traditional	labour	process	analysis	
does	not	offer	a	helpful	explanation	of	recent	developments	in	teachers’	work	(Bach	
et	al.	2006).
Within	this	article,	we	want	to	challenge	the	argument	that	teachers’	work	is	now	best	
understood	 as	 the	 type	 of	 ‘new	 professionalism’	 identified	 in	 policy	 documents	 in	
which,	high	levels	of	skill	and	professional	judgement	are	valued	(riG,	2005).	rather	
we	seek	 to	argue	 that	since	 the	mid-1980s,	when	Connell	described	 teachers’	work	
as	‘a	labour	process	without	an	object’,	there	has	been	a	relentless	drive	to	quantify	
the	 output	 of	 teachers.	 The	 overwhelming	 purpose	 of	 this	 has	 been	 to	 underscore	
the	processes	of	marketisation	and	managerialism	that	are	 the	key	means	by	which	
teachers’	work	is	controlled	and	reconstituted	along	Taylorist	lines.	our	argument	is	
that	in	England	it	is	high	stakes	testing,	now	firmly	buttressed	by	national	inspection,	
that is central to these mechanisms of control.
HIgH STAkES TESTINg, MARkETISATION AND TEACHERS’ 
WORk.
The	 significant	 role	 of	 testing	 within	 the	 English	 education	 system	 can	 only	 be	
fully	appreciated	when	it	is	connected	to	a	series	of	symbiotic	measures	which	have	
embedded	market	forces	deep	within	the	public	education	system.	This	process	began	
as	early	as	1980	(when	the	1980	Education	Act	introduced	so-called	parental	choice	
policies).	However,	as	we	have	argued,	this	process	was	really	set	in	motion	following	
implementation	 of	 the	 1988	 Education	 reform	Act.	 it	 was	 the	 1988	Act	 that	 not	
only	introduced	testing	at	7,	11,	14	and	16	(based	on	the	newly	established	National	
Curriculum)	but	 linked	 this	 to	publication	of	 results	 in	 league	 tables,	expanded	 the	
provision	for	parental	choice	(through	‘open	enrolment’)	and	linked	school	funding	
very	directly	to	student	numbers	(through	a	formula	funding	system	known	as	Local	
Management	of	Schools)	(Levačić,	1990).	it	was	at	this	point	that	an	educational	quasi-
market	was	created	in	the	English	school	sector	(Simon,	1988),	and	it	is	argued	here	
that the period since then has seen the market become progressively more embedded. 
At	the	time	of	writing,	these	processes	have	developed	further	as	local	authorities’	role	
in school planning have been largely marginalised and much more open local markets 
have	been	promoted.	This	process	has	accelerated	with	the	introduction	of	Free	Schools	
(dfE	2013)	whereby	new	schools	are	established	outside	of	local	authority	structures	
(by	groups	of	parents	for	example)	where	it	is	possible	to	demonstrate	local	demand	
exists.	opposition	from	within	local	communities	highlights	that	Free	Schools	can	be	
highly	disruptive	to	local	patterns	of	school	provision	(Guardian,	online	2012).
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The	 logic	 reflects	elementary	market	economic	 theory.	 ‘Consumers’	 require	market	
information in order to make rational choices. Published test results, ranked in league 
tables,	 facilitate	 ‘like-for-like’	 comparison,	 whilst	 open	 enrolment	 allows	 parents	
to	 exercise	 choice.	 Formula-funding,	 driven	 overwhelmingly	 by	 pupil	 numbers,	
ensures that high performing schools generate large numbers of parental preferences, 
and	with	them	additional	resources.	By	contrast,	schools	ranked	lower	in	the	league	
tables	 are	 likely	 to	 attract	 fewer	 parental	 preferences	 and	 hence,	 face	 falling	 rolls,	
and diminishing budgets. Within this quasi- market, high stakes testing is central. 
Just	as	the	economic	market	requires	a	communicative	signal	between	producers	and	
consumers, so too does the educational quasi-market require an equivalent. Therefore, 
published test scores perform a similar, although not equivalent function to price in the 
market for school education. In particular, test scores represent a valorisation of value 
in	the	school	system	–	a	numerical	expression	of	a	school’s	output	that	acts	as	a	signal	
to consumers as they are encouraged to express their preferences. In this sense, test 
scores	form	a	crucial	element	in	the	new	educational	landscape	as	the	invisible	hand	
of the market replaces more visible, and democratic, forms of planning and provision.
However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 this	 is	 not a value determined by the 
interaction of supply and demand in the traditional sense, and therefore it cannot be 
considered a traditional exchange value. Rather it might more accurately be presented 
as	 the	quantification	of	a	use	value	where	 the	use	value	 is	determined	by	 the	state.	
Within	 the	 English	 school	 ‘market’,	 it	 is	 the	 state	 that	 determines	what	 counts	 as	
‘official	knowledge’	(Apple,	2000)	(what	is	taught,	what	knowledge	is	privileged	and	
how	 ‘outputs’	 are	measured	 and	 represented	 in	 the	 form	 of	 test	 scores	 and	 league	
tables)	and	therefore,	it	is	the	state	that	determines	use	value	in	education.	High	stakes	
tests	become	 the	means	by	which	use	value	 is	measured	and	valorised	 (powerfully	
reinforced	 by	 ofsted’s	 use	 of	 categories	 to	 reinforce	 the	 official	 view	 of	 ‘good’).	
Therefore, the quasi- market in school education cannot claim to be a representation 
of	what	consumers	want,	but	 rather	what	 the	state	asserts	 they	should	want.	 in	 the	
current	English	school	system,	there	is	great	play	made	of	‘freedom’,	‘de-regulation’	
and	 ‘autonomy’.	Schools	are	apparently	 free	 to	 respond	 to	what	parents	want.	The	
consumer	is	sovereign.	However,	consumers	can	choose	what	they	want,	only	as	long	
as	they	choose	what	the	state	wants	them	to	want.	To	paraphrase	Henry	Ford,	parents	
can	have	whatever	colour	they	want,	as	long	as	it	is	black	(Ford,	1922).	This	was	the	
hard	 lesson	 learned	 by	 parents	 of	 children	 at	downhills	 school	 (and	 an	 increasing	
number	of	other	schools)	who	fought	to	retain	their	school	in	local	authority	control,	
but	found	the	full	power	of	the	state	mobilised	to	ensure	that	the	school	was	transferred	
to	a	private	contractor	against	their	wishes	(Stevenson	and	Gilliland,	forthcoming).	in	
the landscape of schools policy in England, the free market is never far from the strong 
state,	and	the	market’s	so-called	‘invisible	hand’	still	retains	a	vice-like	grip	on	those	
who	make	 a	 determined	 effort	 to	 fashion	 a	 genuine	 alternative	 to	 state	 sanctioned	
‘good’.
Given the above policy environment, schools are forced to focus their efforts on 
maximising	‘outputs’	to	retain	market	position.	in	market	terms,	institutional	survival	
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depends	 on	market	 success.	As	 a	 consequence	 the	 ‘results	 imperative’	 impacts	 on	
both	 the	 leadership	and	 teaching	processes	of	 schools,	particularly	when	under	 the	
forensic	gaze	of	 the	 school	 inspectorate,	 as	occurs	when	a	 school	 is	 deemed	 to	be	
failing	(Perryman,	2006).	The	intensification	of	market	forces	is	intended	to	place	an	
increased pressure on teachers to improve test scores and for teachers to make this the 
central	focus	of	their	work.	However,	it	is	increasingly	apparent	that	the	intensification	
of market pressures in the system has had a range of other consequences on teacher 
behaviour.	For	example,	there	is	now	an	increasing	recognition	that	so-called	‘gaming’	
in	the	system	has	been	widespread,	whereby	dubious	educational	practices	are	adopted	
in order to optimise market performance and position. These have included the use of 
admissions	criteria,	which	are	used	by	some	to	skew	their	student	populations	to	the	
advantage	of	their	results	in	high	stakes	testing,	(West	et	al,	2004;	West	et	al,	2006),	
the focus of additional support to students on key performance threshold borderlines, 
and the improper use of student exclusions to manipulate aggregate results. To date, 
overt examples of test data manipulation are isolated, and in England there have 
been	very	few	examples	when	compared	to	the	institutional	abuses	witnessed	in	the	
United	States	(LA Times,	2012).	rather,	in	the	English	context,	what	is	presented	is	
a	‘bending’,	rather	than	a	breaking	of	rules	relating	to	the	conducting	of	high	stakes	
assessments	 (ofqual,	 2012).	 These	 are	 sometimes	 presented	 as	 the	 ‘unintended	
consequences’	 of	 policy	 as	 though	 somehow	 their	 occurrence	 could	 not	 have	been	
anticipated.	‘Perverse	incentives’	are	acknowledged,	but	can	apparently	be	regulated	
away.	Nowhere	 is	 the	 link	between	markets	 and	 inequalities	made	explicit,and	nor	
are	the	tensions	between	market	logic	and	professional	ethics,	as	the	market-driven	
pressure	to	focus	on	students	likely	to	‘add	value’	conflict	with	traditional	welfarist	
commitments	to	value	all	students	equally.	Given	the	power	of	the	market,	it	is	by	no	
means	certain	that	professional	ethics	will	triumph	(Stevenson	2007).
HIgH STAkES TESTINg, MANAgERIALISM AND TEACHERS’ 
WORk.
The	emergence	of	a	new	managerialism	in	the	public	sector	generally	(Ferlie	et	al,	1996;	
Hood,	1991),	and	in	education	specifically	(Gewirtz,	2001),	is	well	documented.	The	
processes	have	been	in	place	for	some	considerable	time	and	are	now	well	established,	
even	if	debate	continues	about	the	specificities	of	form	and	content	(Clarke	et	al	2000).	
This	is	evident	in	a	form	of	management	that	draws	heavily	on	private	sector	practice,	
and	which	is	driven	by	an	emphasis	on	target-setting,	performance	review,	and	the	use	
of	incentives	and	sanctions	to	reward	appropriate	behaviours	and	punish	inappropriate	
behaviour	or	what	is	deemed	poor	performance.	The	pursuit	of	such	objectives,	and	
the managerialism that underpins them, are not value neutral, but are rather imbued 
with	the	values	embedded	within	the	wider	system.	Hence,	the	values	of	management	
reflect	the	wider	values	of	the	market,	or	as	Ball	argued,	‘value’	triumphs	over	values	
(Ball,	2003).
At school level teachers experience managerialism principally in the form of target-
setting	and	performance	review,	all	of	which	are	increasingly	underscored	by	testing.	
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This	is	where	traditional	high	stakes	tests	must	now	be	seen	in	the	wider	context	of	
a system that has often generated a raft of internal testing to track student progress 
forensically	at	all	points	across	 their	 school	career	 (allowing	so-called	value-added	
analysis	 and	 comparison	 across	 cohorts).	 internal	 testing	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 timed	
activities,	or	more	general	pieces	of	work,	that	are	used	to	generate	numeric	assessment	
data	that	in	turn	are	used	to	track	both	teachers	and	students.	Students	are	made	aware	
of	the	importance	of	such	tests,	and	become	focused	on	‘performing’	when	required.	
Frequent	internal	testing	has	therefore,	and	intentionally,	made	it	easier	to	quantify	the	
‘output’	of	individual	teachers	on	a	regular	basis,	rather	than	rely	solely	on	the	infrequent	
instrument of annual public testing.  This process has in turn been formally embedded 
in the structures of performance management and the near ubiquitous development 
of data management systems in schools. These ever more complex systems require 
teachers’	performance	to	be	annually	appraised	by	senior	leaders	within	schools	and	
targets for future performance set. In reality, the process is often experienced as one of 
perpetual observation and surveillance as the monitoring of pupil performance in tests 
is	buttressed	by	‘work	scrutinies’	(management	checking	of	student	work	to	monitor	
teacher	performance,	often	conducted	with	no	notice	and	sometimes	without	teacher	
knowledge),	lesson	observations	and	‘learning	walks’	(management	‘walk	throughs’	
of	 curriculum	 areas).	 For	 some	 time,	 performance	management	 has	made	 explicit	
links	to	teachers’	pay,	links	that	have	become	progressively	more	entwined	over	time	
(Carter	et	al	2010).	More	recently,	this	process	has	accelerated	whereby	any	automatic	
pay progression based on length of service is being removed, thereby ensuring that 
all	pay	progression	is	performance-related	(STrB,	2012).	one	head	teachers’	union	
has	 interpreted	 this	 as	 pay	 awards	 only	 being	 made	 to	 teachers	 judged	 as	 ofsted	
‘good’	or	‘outstanding’,	reinforcing	the	notion	that	what	was	once	‘satisfactory’	has	
been	redefined	as	no	longer	acceptable.	The	National	Association	of	Head	Teachers’	
(NAHT)	recommended	pay	policy	for	use	in	schools	is	not	openly	available.	However,	
the commentary of one of the large unions representing classroom teachers highlights 
the issues:
The	 NAHT	 model	 policy	 requires	 teachers	 to	 make	 “good	 progress	 towards	
objectives”, be competent in all areas of the relevant Standards and achieve a 
grading	 of	 “good”	 in	 classroom	 observations.	 Furthermore,	 it	 suggests	 that	
teachers’	 objectives	 should	 become	 progressively	 more	 challenging	 as	 they	
move	up	the	scale;	that	evidence	wider	than	that	available	from	the	performance	
management	/	appraisal	review	may	be	considered	eg	“impact	on	pupil	progress”	
and	“impact	on	wider	outcomes	for	pupils”;	and	that	teachers	who	are	not	graded	
as	“good”	should	not	progress	(NUT,	2013).
The	screw	tightens.	As	the	pressure	on	schools	to	meet	external	targets	has	increased,	
and	as	league	table	pressures	have	intensified,	then	so	too	have	high	stakes	test	scores	
become	a	more	significant	element	of	teachers’	performance	management	targets	and	
the focus for professional discussion.
What	 is	 arguably	most	 developed	 and	widespread	 is	 the	 extent	 to	which	 teachers’	
labour	has	intensified	as	a	result	of	the	increased	pressure	to	deliver	specified	levels	
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of performance as judged by student achievement in external standardised tests. The 
external	tests	are	the	‘public	face’	of	the	assessment	regime,	but	are	built	upon	constant	
internal	 testing	 of	 students	 used	 to	 ‘train’	 them	 in	 the	 culture	 of	 assessment.	 our	
argument is that this represents the operationalisation of the fundamental elements of 
scientific	management,	whereby	managerial	control	of	the	labour	process	is	asserted	
firstly	 by	 finding	ways	 to	 quantify	 the	 value	 of	 individual	 employees’	 output,	 and	
secondly,	by	linking	productivity	and	performance	to	pay	(Chamberlin	et	al,	2002).	
All	 of	 these	 essential	 elements	 of	Taylorist	 scientific	management	 are	 now	 deeply	
embedded	in	the	English	school	system	allowing	student	performance	in	tests	(both	
external	and	 internal)	 to	not	only	determine	merit	payments,	but	now	 to	determine	
whether	 basic	 annual	 increments	 are	 secured	 or	 withheld.	 The	 Chief	 inspector	 of	
Schools	 has	 denied	 that	 the	ofsted	 framework	 implies	 a	 ‘one	 best	way’	model	 of	
teaching	 (scientific	management	par excellence)	 (ofsted,	 2012b),	 although	 teacher	
debate in the blogosphere indicates many teachers in schools perceive and experience 
this	differently.	Many	take	the	view	that	there	is	‘an	ofsted	lesson’:	a	prescribed	format	
which	must	be	followed	if	‘outstanding’	is	to	be	awarded.
it	follows	that	one	consequence	of	the	increasing	importance	of	student	performance	
in	 tests	 of	 all	 types	 is	 a	 substantial	 transfer	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 to	 the	 school	
Principal.	There	can	be	little	doubt	that	within	the	current	English	school	system,	the	
‘frontier	of	control’	(Goodrich,	1920)	has	shifted	decisively	and	that	within	schools,	
power	 and	 control	 has	 transferred	 upwards.	What	 appears	 to	 be	 happening	 is	 that	
a much more coercive and aggressive approach to management is evident in many 
schools.	However,	establishing	the	precise	extent	and	consequences	of	this	is	difficult.	
researching	the	‘dark	side’	(Brooks,	2005)	of	schools	as	organisations	has	never	been	
easy,	but	 it	 is	arguably	becoming	more	difficult	as	 ‘brand-conscious’	head-teachers	
become	more	wary	of	approaches	by	potentially	critical	researchers.	At	the	moment,	
the	picture	we	present	here	draws	on	occasional	evidence	 that	appears	 in	 the	press	
(see	Times Educational Supplement,	2013)	or	from	teacher	union	disputes	(see	Ealing 
Gazette,	 2013).	one	 fascinating	 source	 of	 data	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	The Guardian 
newspaper’s	‘Secret Teacher’.	The	secret	 teacher	 is	 in	fact	not	a	single	 teacher,	but	
rather	the	term	provides	a	cover	by	which	teachers	are	able	to	provide	anonymised	
accounts of their lives in schools. That teachers need to adopt such measures to raise 
a	voice,	arguably	speaks	volumes	of	the	extent	to	which	mechanisms	of	control	are	
stifling	open	and	honest	debate	about	what	is	happening	in	England’s	public	education	
system.	However,	in	the	absence	of	such	debate,	the	accounts	from	the	Secret Teacher 
(and	the	fascinating	comments	that	follow	each	post)	provide	a	revealing	insight	into	
how	the	new	performance-based	culture	translates	into	an	experience	of	work	in	which	
bullying	(Guardian,	online	2013b)	and	castigation	for	failure	(Guardian,	online	2013c)	
appear	to	be	increasingly	common.	in	such	a	system,	where	the	consequences	of	non-
compliance are potentially high, teachers have little option but to conform to meeting 
the	demands	of	a	system	over	which	they	have	ever	diminishing	influence.	Managerial	
control	of	teachers’	work	is	complete,	whilst	resistance	is	made	more	difficult	by	the	
panoply of managerial controls that can be imposed on those considered dissident or 
recalcitrant.
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INTEgRATINg MARkETS AND MANAgERIALISM: fAILURE, 
fRAgMENTATION AND fEAR.
We	 have	 endeavoured	 to	 illustrate	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 processes	 of	
marketisation	 and	 managerialism	 have	 increasingly	 shaped	 teachers’	 experience	
of	work	 in	 the	English	 school	 system.	Each	of	 these	 elements	 is	 distinct,	 but	 both	
are	clearly	 interdependent,	with	each	both	shaping,	and	being	shaped	by,	 the	other.	
Our argument is that the processes of marketisation and managerialism are threaded 
together by narratives of failure, fragmentation and fear, and it is these discourses that 
shape	 teachers’	 experience	 of	work	 and	 provide	 the	 context	within	which	 teachers	
function. 
Narratives	of	systemic	failure	are	central	to	the	drive	to	privatize	public	education.	The	
‘discourse	of	derision’	(Ball,	1990)	is	nothing	new	(see	Callaghan’s	‘Great	debate’	in	
1976,	available	online	at	Gillard,	2010),	and	is	not	unique	to	England	(see	‘A	Nation	
at	risk’	(NCEE	1983)	in	the	USA).	This	narrative	about	a	crisis	in	public	education	
has	always	been	a	central	element	of	the	right’s	discourse	because	people	cannot	be	
expected	to	accept	radical	change	(such	as	privatisation)	unless	they	believe	there	is	
a	major	‘problem’	that,	by	definition,	requires	a	radical	‘solution’.	The	vocabulary	of	
failure	has	also	been	turned	into	quasi-moral	panic	about	‘wasted	lives’	and	the	need	
for rapid solutions to save generations from educational oblivion. In England, in recent 
years,	high	stakes	testing	has	become	central	to	the	discourse	of	‘failing	schools’.	High	
stakes	testing	is	the	means	by	which	national	crises	in	public	education	are	established	
(poor	performance	in	international	league	tables),	individual	schools	are	identified	as	
‘failing’	and	individual	teachers	are	identified	as	‘incompetent’.	
Hence,	a	narrative	of	failure	becomes	much	more	powerful	as	a	means	of	control	when	
it	 is	 sufficiently	nuanced	 to	create	division	between	 those	considered	 ‘failing’,	 and	
those	considered	‘successes’.	Failure	as	a	discourse	of	control	must	therefore	create	
division	as	it	feeds	fragmentation	and	the	rivalry	that	is	generated	when	‘losers’	co-
exist	with	‘winners’.	These	are	the	dividing	lines	that	set	school	against	school	and	
teacher against teacher. Shared interests and identities are fractured as those considered 
‘successful’	 are	 encouraged	 to	 set	 themselves	 apart	 from	 those	who	 ‘fail’.	 in	 such	
contexts, any basis for solidarity is inevitably, and intentionally, undermined.
None	of	the	above	has	serious	consequences	unless	it	is	underpinned	by	fear.	Failure	
must have consequences. In a market, the very real threat of failure is meant to 
engender	anxiety;	hence,	 the	description	of	market	 forces	as	 imposing	a	discipline.	
in	the	new	educational	market	place,	failure	has	become	a	very	real	phenomena,	with	
punitive	consequences	for	schools	deemed	to	be	failing	(the	pressure	of	being	placed	in	
a	‘category’	by	ofsted,	and	the	potential	for	forced	academisation).	At	the	same	time,	
individual	 teachers	are	confronted	with	 ‘notices	 to	 improve’,	and	 formal	capability	
procedures are much more readily invoked. This need to introduce a real sense of fear 
into	the	public	sector	was	articulated	explicitly	by	one	Coalition	government	minister:
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You	 can’t	 have	 room	 for	 innovation	 and	 the	 pressure	 for	 excellence	 without	
having some real discipline and some fear on the part of the providers that 
things	may	go	wrong	if	they	don’t	live	up	to	the	aims	that	society	as	a	whole	is	
demanding	of	them	(Public	Service,	2011).
The	 Minister’s	 convictions	 are	 clear	 –	 real discipline can only be effective in a 
context	 where	 there	 is	 fear, because failure has consequences. In such a climate, 
the fear of failure not only drives a compulsion to conform, but fragmentation and 
division	generate	a	fear	of	resisting.	resistance	and	defiance	are	behaviours	that,	in	
a marketised and managerialist culture are exposing and potentially isolating. They 
generate	a	vulnerability	that	can	be	de-stabilising,	and	the	strength	and	confidence	that	
comes	from	solidaristic	action	is	replaced	by	the	fear	and	vulnerability	that	flows	from	
isolation.	The	educational	market	place	has	created	a	much	more	difficult	environment	
in	which	teachers	can	act	collectively,	and	rather	it	has	created	a	context	in	which	fear	
can	overcome	the	impulse	to	challenge.	For	the	privatisers	to	prevail,	what	is	required	
more	than	anything,	is	for	those	who	seek	to	defend	a	democratic,	public	education	to	
do	nothing.	Fragmentation,	failure	and	fear	are	intended	to	encourage	compliance	and	
acquiescence.
AN ALTERNATIVE fUTURE - RECLAIMINg TEACHINg 
Biesta	 (2010)	 highlights	 the	marked	 impact	 that	 the	measurement	 culture	 has	 had	
on all levels of education, from international policy to the individual classroom. He 
argues	 that	 the	data	provided	by	high	stakes	 testing	has	 in	some	ways	been	useful,	
adding	to	our	understanding	of	the	educative	process.	However,	at	the	same	time	it	
has	led	us	to	have	a	misplaced	belief	in	the	power	of	factual	information.	All	decisions	
which	are	derived	from	data	are,	in	part,	value	judgements	due	to	our	need	to	interpret	
the	data	we	collect.	Consequently,	data	is	seen	through	our	own	values	system,	not	
through	some	mythical	‘objective’	lens.	Biesta	also	highlights	the	problem	of	deciding	
what	to	measure.	do	we	measure	what	we	value,	or	do	we	merely	measure	what	it	is	
easy	to	measure?	in	the	current	English	system,	we	appear	to	measure	that	which	the	
state	values,	and	in	turn	we	align	activity	in	schools	to	meet	those	challenges.	This	
results in a lack of diversity, and a focus on test results as a proxy for the performance 
of teachers:
The	rise	of	a	culture	of	performativity	in	education	–	a	culture	in	which	means	
become ends in themselves so that targets and indicators of quality become 
mistaken for quality itself – has been one of the main drivers of an approach to 
measurement	in	which	normative	validity	is	being	replaced	by	technical	validity	
(Biesta,	2010,	p.13).
The constant use of high stakes testing leads to an underlying system of measurement 
and	control	(o’Neill,	2002),	where	teachers	become	ever	more	focused	on	short-term	
gains and ultimately to an ever greater pressure to teach to the test. We argue that 
as high stakes testing becomes the core of measurement, so the curriculum needs 
to	 align	 to	 this	 philosophy,	 constantly	 being	 refined	 to	 ‘fine-tune’	 the	 outcomes	
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gained from tests. A broad curriculum and assessment regime cannot exist alongside 
simple	measurement,	as	it	assumes	a	range	of	legitimate	perspectives	on	knowledge,	
understanding	and	skills.	Wider	definitions	of	the	curriculum	are	not	easily	measured	
and	compared	to	allow	sorting	of	students	into	winners	and	losers.	in	summary,	the	
higher the stakes, the more relentless the focus on the target. Testing in turn assumes a 
simpler	form	(with	exams	being	exalted	as	the	only	truly	rigorous	assessment)	and	the	
curriculum	necessarily	narrows.	What	matters	is	what	is	measured.
Much	of	what	we	describe	in	 this	article	aligns	with	a	vision	of	 teaching	identified	
by	Hargreaves	 and	Fullan	 (2012)	 as	 one	 based	on	 ‘business	 capital’.	This	 view	of	
education	sees	the	teacher	as	someone	who	works	hard,	but	undertakes	a	task	that	only	
requires moderate intellectual and academic ability. Teaching processes and decisions 
are	taken	on	the	basis	of	numeric	data	and	what	has	been	deemed	to	work	elsewhere,	
and	 ultimately	 comes	 down	 to	 hard	work	 and	measureable	 results.	 However,	 as	 a	
consequence, teachers are not seen as highly educated professionals and can be 
dispensed	with	easily,	their	places	to	be	filled	by	others	keen	to	be	teachers,	‘This is 
the human widget image of the profession’	(Hargreaves	and	Fullan,	2012,	p.	2).	it	is	
based	on	a	‘bring	‘em	in,	burn	‘em	out’	model	of	teaching	with	low	costs	of	training,	
high	pay	for	some,	but	low	pay	for	the	majority	and	limited	long	term	liabilities	(such	
as	pension	entitlements).	it	is	a	Taylorist	model	of	a	teaching	driven	by	a	system	that	
seeks	to	turn	a	profit	from	schooling.	it	is	also	a	model	of	a	profession	unlikely	to	forge	
a	common	identity	and	the	notion	of	an	activist	profession	(Sachs,	2003)	from	which	
professional	confidence	and	solidarity	might	grow.
is	there	an	alternative?	Can	systems	develop	which	do	not	have	high	stakes	testing	
as	 their	 basis	 for	 accountability,	 and	 for	 ‘sorting’	 children	 as	 they	 move	 through	
the education system? And as a by-product of a different system, can the role of 
the teacher be enhanced, thereby raising both educational standards and teaching 
quality?	Hargreaves	and	Fullan	(2012)	highlight	flaws	in	the	U.S.	education	system,	
predominantly focused on an overreliance on standardised measurement and a focus 
on the individual, particularly in relation to issues such as performance related pay. 
instead,	they	argue	that	the	development	of	meaningful	collaboration	between	teachers,	
based on developing professional dialogue and the emergence of outstanding teaching, 
are	where	high	quality	education	will	grow.	
Hargreaves,	(in	Sahlberg,	2010),	starts	by	arguing	that	many	systems,	such	as	those	in	
the	USA	and	England,	have	now	stuck	with	policies	over	the	past	30	years	which	have	
time	and	again	not	worked,	based	around	pressure	on	 teachers,	 increasing	political	
interference and intervention, competition, marketisation and over-testing. After such 
a	long	period,	these	systems	still	cling	to	the	idea	that	this	is	the	one	best	way.	our	view	
is	that	this	is	because	educational	reform	has	not	been	driven	by	what	is	in	the	best	
interests of all children, but by the interests of business and the drive to privatisation.
In contrast, some emerging and rapidly developing economies such as China and 
Singapore	have	started	down	a	very	different	road,	with	diversified	assessment,	local	
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autonomy,	and	innovation	and	creativity	(for	example	Singapore’s	‘Teach	less,	learn	
more‘	(Ng,	2008)).	Therefore,	some	countries	are	already	seeing	a	different	future.	At	
the	heart	of	this	difference	is	a	varied	and	authentic	assessment	regime.	in	Finland,	
children	do	not	have	any	work	graded,	even	internally,	until	 the	age	of	12,	and	the	
only	high-stakes	 tests	 they	face	are	 taken	at	 the	age	of	18,	 the	results	of	which	are	
used	 for	 determining	 university	 entry.	 However,	 even	 here,	 testing	 results	 are	 not	
used	to	hold	teachers	to	account,	they	are	the	responsibility	of	the	students	who	have	
taken	 them.	 in	 both	 Finland	 and	 Singapore,	 teachers	 are	 held	 in	 high	 esteem,	 are	
seen	as	central	 to	 the	social	and	economic	development	of	 the	nations	and	work	in	
collaboration as highly skilled professionals to improve the education of the children 
with	whom	they	work.	Trust,	professionalism	and	essentially	dialogic	systems	lead	to	
high comparative international educational outcomes. High stakes testing has either 
no place or is declining in these systems. There is a conscious focus on the quality 
and development of learning, as opposed to cramming students through high stakes 
testing. Accountability still exists but is attained through dialogue and support for 
teachers. Markets have no place, and consequently there is no need for large scale 
measurement	 to	 feed	 into	 systems	of	 ‘choice’.	The	hand	whose	 invisibility	hides	a	
powerful	 pressure	 to	 control,	 potentially	 becomes	 transformed	 into	 a	 helping	 hand	
focused on support and achievement for all.
What becomes apparent is that there are diverging paths in the rapidly globalising 
education policy environment. Some systems become dominated by business 
capital models, creating ever more elaborate accountability systems fed by constant 
‘measurement’	of	teachers	and	students,	and	which	make	use	of	high	stakes	testing,	an	
ever expanding and valuable industry to a burgeoning private sector. As this inevitably 
leads	to	criticism	of	standards	and	the	quality	of	education,	however	narrowly	defined,	
the professional standing of teachers is diminished. As such, marketised systems 
slowly	spin	into	spirals	of	decline.	England	is	in	the	vanguard	of	this	tradition.
The	alternative	future	is	one	which	sees	the	professional	capital	of	teachers	as	a	driver	
for improvement and incremental change. Such change is also based on the foundation 
of education being seen as a social good, as opposed to an economic opportunity. In 
this alternative system, the focus is on learning, leading to a spectrum of assessment 
types	 which	 have	 an	 authentic	 character,	 and	 which	 perversely	 will	 have	 greater	
utility	 in	 the	wider	world	 beyond	 school.	 it	 is	 in	 this	wider	 debate	 concerning	 the	
nature of assessment, and its relationship to both management of education and the 
marketisation of schooling, that high stakes testing exists. 
Given	the	dominance	of	the	business	capital	model	within	the	English	school	system,	
it	is	difficult	to	envisage	the	circumstances	in	which	the	trajectory	of	current	policy	
may	be	interrupted,	let	alone	reversed.	Moreover,	as	we	have	argued	in	this	article,	
the combination of failure, fragmentation and fear are intended to undermine the 
solidarities	that	might	offer	resistance	to	this	agenda.	However,	our	belief	is	that	such	
possibilities exist. The drive to an intense market model in schools, underpinned by 
relentless high stakes testing, is one that is often challenged by teachers and indeed 
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parents	(Stevenson	and	Gilliland	forthcoming).	By	its	nature,	such	resistance	is	often	
issue-focused	and	isolated.	However,	there	is	the	possibility	that	as	the	break-up	of	the	
public education system in England continues apace diverse loci of dissent overcome, 
their	historic	divisions	and	alliances	of	resistance	begin	to	coalesce.	At	this	point,	new	
possibilities emerge.
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